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Recent advances in miniaturization, low-cost and low-power design have led to 
active research in large-scale, highly distributed systems of small, wireless, low-p er, 
unattended sensors and actuators [1]. The power of wireless sensor networks lies in the 
ability to deploy large numbers of tiny nodes that assemble and configure themselves. 
Usage scenarios for these devices range from real-time tracking, to monitoring of 
environmental conditions, to ubiquitous computing environments, to in situ monitoring of 
the health of structures or equipment [2]. While often referred to as wireless sensor 
networks, they can also control actuators that extend control from cyberspace into the 
physical world [3].
The sensors can be installed at pre-selected locations and data can be collected 
from specific location with the help of the neighbors. In this paper we target the 
Berkeley’s MICA motes and the TinyOS sensor platform. The MICA sensor node is 
manufactured by Cross Bow technology and can be programmed using the nesC 
language. The hardware runs the programs in the TinyOS platform. The specifications of 
MICA mote are:
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• 4MHz Atmega 128L processor.
• 128K bytes flash 4K bytes SRAM 4K bytes EEPROM.
• 916MHz radio transceiver with a maximum data rate of 40Kbits/sec.
• Attached AA (2) battery pack for power supply.
• An analog-to-digital converter (ADC) converts the analog signals from the 
different sensors on the sensor board to 10-bit digital format.
Figure 1: Sensor Nodes
1.2TinyOS
The demands placed on the software of wireless sensor networks are numerous. It 
must be efficient in terms of memory, processor, and power so that it meets strict 
application requirements. It must also be agile enough to allow multiple applications to 
simultaneously use system resources such as communication, computation and memory 
3
[3]. The extreme constraints of these devices make it impractical to use legacy systems 
[3]. TinyOS is an operating designed explicitly for networked sensors. 
TinyOS executes only one program at a time. It holds the necessary software 
components in the memory. There are two threads of execution in TinyOS: tasks and 
hardware event handlers [4]. Tasks are functions whose execution can be differed. Once 
scheduled for execution, tasks run to completion. Hardware event handlers are the one 
which is invoked by the hardware interrupts. The hardware interrupts can preempt the 
execution of a task or other hardware event handler. The applications that run in TinyOS 
are written in nesC language. 
4
CHAPTER II
ROUTING IN SENSOR NETWORKS
2.1 Introduction
A sensor network is formed by hundreds or thousands of low-c st, low-power 
nodes to monitor events in an area. A node communicates with other nodes that lie within 
the transmittable range to accomplish the given tasks. Due to the storage and energy 
constraints the sensor network routing protocols are much simpler than any other network 
routing protocols. The sensor network is often compared to the ad- oc networks. Like the 
sensor networks, the ad-hoc networks also depend on the cooperative nature of the nodes. 
The main difference between the ad-hoc networks and the sensor network is the 
computational power of the nodes. The ad-hoc routing protocols are designed for the 
traditional nodes rather than for the special hardware like the MICA mote. The various 
routing protocols proposed for the sensor networks are:
1. TinyOS Beaconing. 
2. Geographic Routing.
3. Minimum Cost Forwarding.





The TinyOS beaconing protocol constructs a breadth first spanning tree rooted at 
a base station [1]. The base station broadcasts the route update message periodically. The 
nodes which receive this message update the routing information and also mark the base 
station as its parent. Each node also broadcasts the routing information, the nodes 
receiving this message marks the node from which it gets the message as its parent. The 
algorithm continues recursively with eachnode marking its parent as the first node from 
which it hears a routing update during the current time epoch [1].
Figure 2: A representative topology constructed using TinyOS beaconing
2.3 Geographic Routing
The Geographic and Energy Aware Routing (GEAR) routing protocol depends on 
the geographic location of the nodes. The Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) is 
a variation of geographic routing protocol. The GPSR uses greedy forwarding at each 
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hop, forwarding to the neighbor closest to the destination. When holes arencountered 
where greedy forwarding is impossible, GPSRrecovers by routing around the perimeter 
of the void [1]. Onedrawback of GPSR is that packets along a single flow will always 
use the same nodes for the routing of each packet, leading to uneven power consumption 
in nodes [1].
2.4 Minimum Cost Forwarding
All the nodes in the network maintain a cost field. The cost field specifies the 
minimum cost required to reach the base station. To forward a packet to the base station, 
the node checks the cost field associated with a neighbor and chooses the minimum cost 
route. The cost field can store any metric like hop-count, energy, latency or loss. The 
advantage of this protocol is that there is no need to maintain the path information. This 
protocol also has the disadvantage of using the same link for forwarding the packets.
2.4 Clustering Based Protocols
LEACH (Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy) leverages clustering to 
efficiently disseminatequeries and gather sensor readings to and from all nodes inthe 
network [1]. LEACH assumes that every node in the network can reach the base station 
directly. But reaching the base station in one-hop is a high power operation which is 
inefficient considering the power available in the sensor nodes. LEACH organizes the 
nodes into clusters with one node acting as a cluster head. The nodes within a cluster 
send the collected data to its cluster head and the cluster heads of the entire cluster 
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communicate to aggregate the data. The aggregated data is then forwarded to the base 
station.
2.5 Rumor Routing
Rumor routing is a probabilistic protocol for matchingqueries with data events.
The query from the base station is flooded in the entire network. The data events in 
response to the queries are shared by the nodes. The base station does not depend on a 
single link to receive the events. The disadvantage of this algorithm is the cost associated 
with the flooding of the queries and the data events. A variation of rumor routing 
algorithm injects the interest queries only to a small number of nodes. An agent is used to 
collect the information about the events. The information collected by the agent is shared 
with the nodes in the network. 
2.6 Directed Diffusion
Directed diffusion consists of several elem nts: interests, data messages, gradients 
and reinforcements [5]. The base station floods the sensor network with the query about 
the interested events. The query is called as the interest in the sensor networks. Each 
interest contains the description about the sensing task. The data messages are the events 
generated by a single or a group of nodes in response to the query send by the base 
station. In directed diffusion, query is named using attribute-value pairs [5]. The interest 
queries are disseminated throughout the sensor network as an interest for named data. 
This dissemination sets up the “gradients” within the network to draw events. A gradient 
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is direction state created in each node that receives an interest [5]. The node, which 
generates the events, sends the events back to the base station along multiple gradient 
paths. The directed diffusion algorithm assumes that each node knows its location once 
deployed.
2.6.1 Naming
In [5], location tracking task was used to explain the directed diffusion algorithm. 
The same application is used in this paper to see how query is disseminated in to the 
network. The query send by the base station is a list of attribute-valu  pair. For locating a 
vehicle the task description will be, 
Type=Wheeled vehicle //Detect Vehicle location
Interval=20 ms //send events every 20 ms
Duration=10 seconds//send data till this time
Rectangle= [-100, 100, 200, 400]
The data sent in response to this query is also named. For example the sensor that detects 
the wheeled vehicle might respond like,
Type=Wheeled vehicle //type of vehicle seen
Instance=truck //instance of this type
Location= [125, 220] //node location
Intensity= 0.6 //signal amplitude measure
Confidence= 0.85 //confidence in match
Time Stamp= 01:20:40 //Event Generation Time
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2.6.2 Interests and Gradients
The interest is injected in to the network by the base station. 
2.6.3 Interest Propagation
The [5] describes how interests are diffused throughout the network. Using an 
example task, the authors of [5] explain the propagation of interest in the sensor 
networks. We will use the same example here. They have considered that a task with 
specified type, rect, duration of 10 minutes and an interval of 10 ms is instantiated at the 
base station. The interval parameter specifies an event data rate. So for our example the 
data rate will be 100 events per second. The base station records the task. The task will be 
removed from the base station after the time specified in the duration field. For each 
active task the base station broadcasts this message periodically. The initial message for 
setting up the gradients and fetching the data will have much larger interval. Intuitively, 
this initial message is thought of as exploratory; the base station tries to determine if there 
indeed some nodes in the specified region senses the task specified [5]. The following is 
query is an exploratory message,
Type=Wheeled vehicle
Interval=1 ms




The base station periodically refreshes the message. This is done by simply 
sending the same interest message with increasing time stamp. This is necessary since the 
interests are not reliably transmitted in the network. The refresh rate is a protocol design 
parameter that trades off overhead for increased robustness to lost interests [5].
Each node in the network maintains an interest cache. The interest cache contains 
the information about the interest it received. Two interests are considered distinct, if 
atleast one of the attribute values is different. Interest cache does not have information 
about the base station but the one-hop neighbor from which it received the interest. Thus, 
the interest rate scales with the number of distinct active interest. There are several fields 
in the interest cache. A time stamp field indicates the time stamp of the last event
received. The interest cache also contains several gradient fields, up to one per neighbor.
Each gradient contains the data rate field which contains the data rate requested by the 
corresponding neighbor, derived from the interval attribute. It also maintains a duration 
field derived from the time stamp and the expiresAt attributes. 
When a node receives an interest, it checks the interest cache to see if the interest 
already exists. If no matching entry exists in the interest cache, then the node creates on  
interest entry and stores the information about the interest. This entry has a single 
gradient towards the neighbor form which it received the interest [5]. For the example 
taken in [5], the neighbor of a base station will setup an interest entry with a gradient of 1 
event per second towards the base station. The node has to distinguish the neighbors in 
order to send the data at the requested rate. Use of 802.11 MAC address is discussed in 
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[2] for this purpose. If the entry already exists then the tim  stamp and expires at field are 
updated. When a gradient expires, it is removed from its interest entry. After storing the 
information about the interest, a node will send the interest to all its neighbors.
2.6.4 Gradient Establishment
Figure 3 shows the gradient establishment between the nodes. Every pair of 
neighboring node establishes a gradient towards each other. This is because; when a node 
receives an interest message from its neighbor it has no way f knowing whether that 
interest was in response to the one it sent out earlier, or it is an identical interest from the 
other side of the neighbor [5]. Such a two way gradients can cause a node to receive one 
copy of low data rate events from each of its neighbors [5]. But this technique can enable 
the fast recovery from failed nodes.




The gradient specifies the data rate and the direction in which to send events. In 
summary, interest propagation sets up state in the network to pull down the data events 
from the source node. The rules for interest propagation are application specific [5]. Due 
to the multi-path transmission of the interest, it is not possible for an adversary to prevent 
the interest information from reaching the nodes in the network [5].
2.6.5 Data Propagation
The node which lies in the specified rect value, tasks its sensors to begin 
collecting samples. If the node finds the target then it will search its interest cache for a 
matching interest entry. If a matching interest is found then the node will look at the data 
rate parameter for all the gradients and forward the data at the rate specified. In our case 
this will be 1 event per second initially for all gradients. So, all the neighbors receive a 
copy of the event. The source node unicast the events, to all the neighbors for which it 
has a gradient. If the data rates of downstream nodes are different, then the source node 
interpolates the messages it is sending to the high data rate neighbor. The interpolated 
message is send to the low data rate neighbor.
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Figure 4: Data Propagation
The node which receives the events from the source, attempts to find a matching 
entry in its interest cache. If a match does not exist then the data message is dropped 
silently. If there exists a match, then the node checks the data cache associated with the 
matching interest entry. The data c che keeps track of recently seen data items.It has 
several potential uses, one of which is loop prevention.If a received data message has a 
matching data cache entry, thedata message is silently dropped. Otherwise, the received 
messageis added to the data cache and the data message is sentto the node’s neighbors
[5].
2.6.6 Positive Reinforcement
The data message will eventually reach the base station. The base station 
reinforces one particular neighbor, and that neighbor, reinforces one of its upstream 




reinforcement is nothing but the same interest message with the increase in the data rate. 
The higher data rate events allow high quality tracking [5]. The local rules for choosing 
one particular node are application specific. Any node in the network can send a positive 
reinforcement to its upstream neighbor if that node consistently sends the unseen event to 
it.
Figure 5: Positive Reinforcement
2.6.7 Path Truncation Using Negative Reinforcement
A node on the data flow path can also be negatively reinforced if that node cannot 
consistently supply new events to the downstream nodes. An interest message, with the 
initial exploratory data rate is send to the node which needs to be negatively reinforced. 
Like positive reinforcement, the negative reinforcement message is also forwarded to the 
source node. The nodes receiving this message change their data rate of the neighbor. For 
example, let us consider from the following figure that the data flows in the path A->C-




the node D (since the other link is congested). This prompts node E to negatively 
reinforce node C and positively reinforce node D.












ATTACKS ON DIRECTED DIFFUSION
3.1 Introduction
One aspect of sensor network that complicate the design of a secure routing 
protocol is the in-network aggregation [1]. At various locations in the network, the nodes 
need to aggregate the information from other nodes. This help in removing the duplicate 
messages flowing in the network. End-to-end mechanism is used in the conventional 
network for message authenticity, integrity and confidentiality. But end-to-end security 
mechanism is not feasible in sensor network because the communication is mainly 
between the one-hop neighbors. Since the MICA motes have a very slow processor (4 
MHz), it is not possible to use the 128 bit encryption mechanism. The directed diffusion 
algorithm does not use any keying mechanism to prevent the nodes from outsider attacks. 
In the following sections we explain the possible attacks on directed diffusion algorithm. 




4. Selective forwarding and data tampering.
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An attacker with laptop-class devices can domore than an attacker with only 
ordinary sensornodes. An ordinary sensor node might only be ableto jam the radio link 
in its immediate vicinity,while a laptop-class attacker might be able to jamthe entire 
sensor network using its strongertransmitter. A single laptop-class attacker mightbe able 
to eavesdrop on an entire network, whilesensor nodes would ordinarily have a limited
range [5]. Also, laptop-class attackers might have ahigh-bandwidth, low-latency 
communications channel not available to ordinary sensor nodes,allowing such attackers 
to coordinate their efforts [5].
3.2 Suppression
Flow suppression is an instance of denial of service attack. The easiest way to 
suppress a flow is to spoof negative reinforcements. The adversary simply sends the 
negative reinforcement to the node which is delivering data at a high rate. The adversary 
has to find out the unique id of the downstream node and the interest information. Since 
there is no keying mechanism to verify the authenticity of the message, the upstream 
neighbor which received the negative reinforcement further forwards the message to its 
upstream node.
3.3 Cloning
Each node in the network will be assigned a unique id before deployment. The 
base station will also have a unique id. The base station can inject the interest information 
at any node in the network [5]. If the goal of the adversary is to receive the data messages 
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generated by the source node then the adversary has to announce that it a base station. 
This is done by receiving the interest information from the authentic base station and 
modifying the packet information. The adversary will change the source id in the packet 
to its own id. Now the adversary also receives a copy of the data message from the source 
node. 
3.4 Path Influence
By injecting information about the energy available to do complex calculations 
and/or about the availbility of quality link the adversary can influence the nodes in the 
data flow path. For example if the adversary is located in the low-data flow path, it can 
influence all the nodes in the high data flow path by sending an announcement that it has 
more remaining battery power to do multiple calculations. This attracts the neighboring 
nodes to send the packets to the adversary. The attacker also can announce the 
availability of high quality link by sending a powerful signal which makes the high data 
flow path nodes to send the data to the adversary. Now the data will flow through the 
adversary. The adversary can also launch this attack by spoofing positive and negative 
reinforcement.
3.5 Selective Forwarding and Data Tampering
By using the above attack to insert itself onto the path taken by a flow of events, 
an adversary can gain control of the flow. The adversary can modify the packets or 
forwards the packets selectively. 
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CHAPTER IV
KEY ESTABLISHMENT, ASSUMPTION AND DESIGN GOALS
4.1 Symmetric Key Algorithm
In symmetric key algorithm only one key is used for both encryption and 
decryption. It requires a shared key between the nodes. When compared to the 
asymmetric key algorithm, the calculation is nearly 1000 times faster [6]. TinySec [7], a 
security mechanism provided for sensor nodes in TinyOS environment uses the 
symmetric key algorithm. SPINS [6], another security protocol for sensor network also 
uses symmetric key algorithm to provide message authentication, integrity and 
confidentiality. In this paper we are proposing the integration of LEAP [8], a security 
protocol for the sensor networks, in to directed diffusion. The reason we choose LEAP 
(Localized Encryption and Authentication protocol) is because it provides security based 
on the importance of the message. For example the announcement from the base station 
gets a minimal security when compared to a packet from source node which gets 
maximum security. Four different keys are used in each node to provide various level of 
security. In the other two mechanisms (SPINS and TinySec), only one key is used. The 
four keys used in LEAP algorithm are:
1. Cluster Key
2. Global Key 
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3. Pair-wise Key and.
4. Individual key
4.1.1 Pair-wise shared key
Each node shares a pair-wise key with all its neighbors. This key is used for the 
secure communication between a node and one of its neighbors. Most of the 
communication in sensor networks is one hop, so it is logical to have a pair-wise shared 
key for all the nodes.
4.1.2 Global Key
All the nodes in the sensor network share a common key with the base station. 
The base station uses this key to encrypt the interest message and all the nodes in the 
network uses this key to decrypt the announcements from the base station. The nodes 
store the interest information in their interest cache and then encrypt the message using 
the global key to further broadcast it. The communication cost is reduced by using this 
key, since it is enough to broadcast the interests. 
4.1.3 Individual Key
Each node will have a unique key. This key is shared between the base station and 
a node. The individual key is used for secure communication between a node and the 
base station. The base station uses this key to verify the messages sent by this node and
also for updating the global key of the node.
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The LEAP algorithm was built for all the routing protocols. The protocols such as 
LEACH in which the nodes form many clusters, can use the cluster key. In directed 
diffusion, all the communications are betwen one-hop neighbors so there is no need for 
a cluster key. In this paper we discuss how a reasonable level of security can be provided 
by using three keys.
4.2 Assumptions and Design Goals
4.2.1 Network and Security assumptions
We assume that the sensor network is static, i.e., sensor nodes are not mobile. The 
base station, acting as controller (or key server), is assumed to be a laptop class device 
and supplied with long-lasting power. We also assume that the base station is equipped 
with a powerful transmitter and it can send the message to any node in the network in 
one-hop. The sensor nodes are similar in their computational and communication 
capabilities and power resourcesto current generation sensor nodes, e.g. the Berkeley 
MICA motes. We assume that every node hasspace for storing up to hundreds of bytes of 
keying materials. The sensor nodes can be deployed via aerialscattering or by physical 
installation. However, we assume that the immediate neighboring nodes of anysensor 
node will not be known in advance.Because wireless communication is not secure, we 
assume an adversary can eavesdrop on all traffic,inject packets or replay older messages. 
We also assume that thebase station will not be compromised.
22
4.2.2 Design Goals
The main goal of our algorithm is to design an efficient security mechanism for 
supporting communications in directed diffusion. The security requirements not only 
include authentication and confidentialitybut also robustness and survivability. In other 
words, the sensor network should be robust against varioussec rity attacks, and if an 
attack succeeds, its impact should be minimized. For example, the compromiseof a 
single node should not break the security of the entire network.
4.3 Key Establishment
4.3.1 Introduction
The idea of establishing the individual, global and pair-wise shared key is taken 
from the LEAP protocol. The LEAP protocol uses the Pseudo-Random functions to 
derive the keys. The base station derives one master key KI and this key is loaded in to all 
the nodes in the network before deployment. Each node is also assigned a unique id and a 
global key before deployment. The LEAP protocol uses the following notations.
N- Number of nodes in the network.
u, v – nodes in the network.
{f k} – Family of pseudo random functions
{Sk} – Encryption of message S with key k 
MAC (k, S) is the message authentication code (MAC)of message S using a 
symmetric key k.
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From a key K a node can derive other keys for varioussecurity purposes. For 
example, a node can use K0 = fK(0) for encryption and use K1 = fK(1) for authentication
[8]. 
4.3.2 Establishing Individual Key
Every node has an individual key that is only shared withthe base station.The 
individual key Ku for a node u (each node has aunique id) is generated as follows:
Ku = fK I(u). Here f isa pseudo-random function and KI is a master key. In this scheme 
the base station mightkeep only its master key to save the storage needed to keepall the 
individual keys. When it needs to communicate withan individual node u, it computes Ku
on the fly. Due tothe computational efficiency of pseudo random functions,the 
computational overhead is negligible [8].
4.3.3. Establishing Pair-wise shared key
Since the communication in sensor network is always among the neighbors, the 
pair-wise shared key is used more than any other key. The establishment of pair-wise 
shared key is described in the LEAP algorithm. We are using the idea described in the 
LEAP for our case.
The authors of LEAP assume that the nodes in the network can withstand the 
possible attack by the adversary for atleast a short interval (in seconds). They assume that 
the time required to establish all the keys in the network (Test) is less then the time 
required (Tmin) by the adversary to compromise one or more nodes. 
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When a node u is deployed, it first initializesa timer to fire after time Tmin. It then 
tries todiscover its neighbors. It broadcasts a HELLO message which contains its id and 
waits for each neighborv to respond with an ACK message including the identityof node 
v. The ACK from every neighbor v is authenticatedusing the individual key Kv of node 
v, which was derived as Kv = fKI (v). Since node uknows KI, it can derive Kv and then 
verify node v’s identity [8].
u  *: u. ; /*  Node u broadcasts the Hello packet specifying with its id in the 
packet */
vu: v,MAC(Kv, u-v) ; /* v replies to u with its id and the calculate MAC. The MAC is 
calculated using the individual key Kv for the message u-v (the ids of u and v).*/
Node u computes its pair-wisekey with v, Kuv, as Kuv = fKv (u). Node v canalso 
compute Kuv in the same way [8]. Kuv serves astheir pair-wise key. No message is 
exchanged betweenu and v in this step. Note that node u does not haveto authenticate 
itself to node v by sending a specialmessage, because any future messages authenticated
with Kuv by node u will prove node u’s identity [8].
4.3.4. Establishing Global Key
The global key can be established before the deployment of sensors. Since all the 
nodes are going to share the same key with the base station, the loading of this key can be 
done before deployment. 
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4.4 Key Erasure
When the timer Tmin expires, node u erases KI (the master key) and all the 
individual keys Kv’s of its neighbors, which itcomputed in the neighbor discovery phase
[8]. Note thatnode u does not erase its own individual key Ku. Everynode keeps its own 
individual key.
After the above steps, node u will have established a pair-wiseshared key with 
each of its neighbors and erased key KI. No nodes in thenetwork possess KI. An 
adversary may have eavesdroppedon all the traffic in this phase, but without KI it cannot 
inject erroneous information or decrypt any of the messages.
4.5 Node Addition
If a node does not establish a pair-w se key with a neighbor before Tmin, it cannot 
establish a pair-wise key for ever, since all the nodes in the network would have erased 
the master key KI. Note that a new node entering the network can establish the pair-wise 
key with the neighbors [8]. For example let us say that node u is the new node with the 
master key KI and node v is already in the network. After deployment, node u will derive 
its individual key Ku using KI and then it sends the broadcasts a “Hello” packet. On 
receiving the “Hello” packet from node u, node v derives the pair-wise key Kuv as,
Kuv = fKv (u). Node v then calculates the message authentication MAC(Kv,u-v) and 
unicasts to node u. Since node u posses the master key KI it also can calculate the pair-
wise key.
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The problem with this approach is if an adversary is successful in finding the 
master key KI before the time Tmin, then the adversary can derive the entire pair-wise 
keys. LEAP solves this problem by introducing the concept of multiple master keys. 
LEAP algorithm assumes that there are at most m node addition events and that these m 
events occur in m intervals T1, T2, T3,…Tm, respectively, where these intervals could be 
of different lengths [8]. The base station generates these m keys (K1, K2, 3,... Km). A 
node u deployed in time interval Ti is loaded with the key Ki, from which the node 
derives the individual key Ki (u) =fKi(u) [8]. It is also loaded with individual keys Kj(u) = 
fK j (u) for all i < j <= m, and it will use theindividual key Kj(u) (i < j<= m) for 
establishing pair-wise keys with nodes deployed in Tj. 
When deployed, node u uses Ki to establish pair-wise keys with its neighbors and 
then erases Ki, as in LEAP’s original scheme.For example, a node u deployed in the first 
time interval T1 is loaded with K1 and Kj(u)’s for all 1< j <=m. It derives its individual 
key K1(u) and uses K1 as the initialmaster key to establish pair-wise keys with its
neighbors, and then erases K1 after Tmin. Note that the base station shouldalso erase the 
initial key K1, since it is no longer needed [8]. When adding a sensor node v in T2, the 
networkcontroller loads node v with master key K2, from which the node derives its 
individual key K2(v), and m−1 individual keys K2(v),K3(v), ...,Km(v) [8]. Node v uses K2
to establish pair-wise keys with the neighboring nodesthat were deployed in T1 or T2, 
because v can derive the individual keys of its neighbors in T2. When its timerexpires, 
node v erases K2.
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CHAPTER V
PROPOSAL TO ENCHANCE DIRECTED DIFFUSION
5.1 Security Analysis
With the introduction of keying mechanism in directed diffusion, only the nodes 
which have the keys can send and receive packets in the network. The outsider attack is 
completely ruled out.
The size of the keys used in LEAP is 8 bytes [8]. It has been proved that a laptop 
class adversary can crack the message which was encrypted using the symmetric key 
algorithm [14]. It is possible that an adversary finds out the keys. If the adversary is 
successful in finding the key, then the above said attack c n still be launched. This is the 
insider attack, an attack which is very difficult to find. Because of its disadvantages, the 
use of symmetric key algorithm alone is not enough for providing security in sensor 
networks. We propose new methods by which we can differentiate between authentic and 
fake packets. We show how our scheme minimizes the effects of an attack.
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5.2 Assumptions
We assume that the sensor network is dense and there will be atleast two 
neighbors (with enough power) for each node. We also assume that the probability to 
break more than one pair-wise key of the same node is very minimal. 
5.3 Cloning Attack
If the goal of the attacker is to receive a copy of the data messages from the 
source node, then this type of attack is launched. To launch this attack the adversary need 
the global key. If the adversary successfully breaks the global key and decrypts the 
interest message from the base station, then it can forge the message with itself listed as 
the base station. The neighboring nodes further forwards this message in the network. 
This sets up gradients along the path. The adversary is yet to achieve the goal. The 
adversary needs atleast one pair-wise key shared between the nodes in the data flow path 
to decrypt the data message sent by the source node.
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Figure 7: Cloning Attack
In figure 7, let A be the source node and C be the base station. The base station 
encrypts the interest message using the global key and broadcasts. Let us assume that the 
adversary has broken the global key. Since the adversary holds the global key it can 
decrypt the interest information from C and can forge the interest information with itself 
listed as the base station [1]. The adversary can then broadcast the fake message. The 
nodes which receive the fake message, decrypts using the global key and stores the 
information in their interest cache. This will form a new path to pull down the data from 
the source node. The adversary needs one pair-wise key shared between any nodes in the 
data flow path to decrypt the data messages from the source node, since data messages 










If each node in the network maintains the distance information of the base station, 
then the probability for this type of attack can be reduced. The distance of a node can be 
calculated using the signal strength of the message it transmitted. Various papers [9, 10,
15, 16, 17, and 18] discuss the possibility of using the RSSI (Received Signal Strength 
Indicator) values to localize the sensor network. Localization is a scheme by which all the 
nodes in the sensor network will learns about the location it is situated using one or more 
mobile nodes.
5.3.1.1 RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator).
Definition: A signal that indicates the strength of the incoming (received) signal 
in a receiver.
Using the signal strength, the distance of the node is found. Papers [9, 11 and 18] 
uses RSSI alone to find the distance where as paper [12] uses RSSI and acoustic signal in 
determining the distance of the node from which the signal is received. The advantage of 
the scheme discussed in [12] is the accuracy when compared to the schemes introduced in 
[9, 11 and 18] but it needs additional hardware. The MICA mote already comes with the 
hardware necessary to calculate the RSSI. 
The signal strength is directly proportional to the remaining battery power. With 
the decrease in the battery power the signal strength reduces and the distance increases. 
This causes the distance estimation with errors but we have assumed that the base station 
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is equipped with long lasting power, so the signal strength never reduces in this case. The 
nodes can find out the distance of the base station with reasonable amount of accuracy.
During the initial set-up time, the base station should broadcast the “Hello” 
packets powerful enough to reach all the nodes in the network. Each node receives this 
message and stores the RSSI value of the base station. Each node has to calculate the 
RSSI value of any future message received from the base station and compare with the 
existing value. Even if the adversary has the powerful transmitter, it is very difficult to 
transmit with the same power in order to fake the nodes. Note that there is a chance that 
the noise level is high or there are many obstructions in the path. This causes the node to 
receive a weaker signal and leads to a problem of nodes rejecting the authentic base 
station’s message. This can be solved by having a MAX value and a MIN value of RSSI. 
The nodes in the network should accept the packets if the RSSI is with in the MAX and 
MIN value.
Figure 8: Signal strength measurement as a function of distance
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5.4 Flow Suppression
Definition: A data flow path can be suppressed if a node gives a negative 
reinforcement to its upstream neighbor. A negative reinforcement is nothing but the 
interest information with initial exploratory data rate. 
Figure 9: Negative Reinforcement
5.4.1 Normal operation
Let us consider that node A as the source node and node C as the base station 
from figure 9. Let us assume that the data flow path is A->B->C. The data flow path 
nodes supply the data at a much faster data rate when compared to the other nodes in the 
network. If the path between A and B or B and C is congested and if the congestion 
prevails for long time, then the paths A->D->E or A- >F- >G gives the required data to the 









base station then the base station will positively reinforce E or G. After positively 
reinforcing one of E or G, the base station also negatively reinforces B. This will cause 
the node B to negatively reinforce the source (A) thereby suppressing the data flow. 
5.4.2 Attacks using negative reinforcement
If the adversary breaks the pair-wise key shared between the nodes A and B then, 
it can simply send a negative reinforcement to node A posing as node B. Node B receives 
this information and changes the data rate value in the in erest cache. This is a simple 
instance of denial of service attack.
5.4.3 Proposed Solution
For negative reinforcement information to be valid and processed further, the 
node which received the negative reinforcement should also receive the information 
about negative reinforcement from atleast one more neighbor. For example, if B sends a 
negative reinforcement to A and if it has to be valid, then the adversary has to 
compromise atleast one other neighbor of B (breaking the pair-wise keys used between B 
and one other neighbor). Since we have assumed that it will be difficult for the adversary 
to break more than one pair-wise shared key of a single neighbor, the negative 
reinforcement attack can be prevented. Note that we also have assumed that each node 
will have atleast two neighbors. If node A did not get the confirmation of negative 
reinforcement information from one other neighbor then it decides that the negative 
reinforcement information is not authentic and sends the information to the base station 
for key revocation. 
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5.5 Path Influence
The adversary can attract all the traffic through itself by announcing the 
availability of more energy and/or the availability of a high quality link to reach the base 
station (by sending a powerful signal). All the nodes start sending the packets to this 
adversary. After receiving the packets, the adversary can choose to forward packets 
selectively or change the packet information andforward it.
Let us consider the node A as the source and node C as the base station from 
figure 10. If the adversary breaks the pair-wise key shared by nodes E and B, it might try 
to attract all the nodes in the network by sending a fake announcement to B .The message 
can be regarding the availability of high quality path to base station and/or the high 
remaining battery power. On receiving the information, B further forwards to all its 
neighbors. The nodes which need to perform long calculation and the odes which need 
to send the packet to the base station will be attracted. To prevent this type of attack we 
propose a new technique using the RSSI value and the remaining energy. 
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Figure 10: Path Influence
5.5.1 Proposed Solution
We have earlier assumed that the adversary takes Tmin time to break a pair-wise 
key of a node and it is larger than the time it takes for all the sensor nodes to establish the 
pair-wise keys. During this initial setup period each sensor node should construct a hash 
table with the node id as the unique key. The table should contain remaining battery 
power and RSSI value for all its neighbors. A hash table is a data structure to store the 
data and can be searched for an item in O (1) time. The nodes store the data during the 
pair-wise key setup time. Each node is expected to append its remaining battery power 
with every packet so that the neighbor nodes can construct the table. Note that because of 
our assumption that the adversary takes atleast Tmin ime to break one or more keys, the 
initial packets from the nodes will be authentic and the information about battery will 






Node ID Energy Remaining RSSI
Table1: Table for storing RSSI and battery power
Let us assume that the adversary has broken the pair-wise shared key between any 
two nodes. To attract a neighbor, the adversary has to nnounce that the node has a high 
remaining power. Now if the adversary tries to send a fake message about a node’s 
energy availability, the receiving node will find out by comparing the battery power 
remaining for that node from the table. The battery value of a node will never increase; 
even the sleeping nodes will consume some battery power, so this type of attack can be 















Table 2: Packet with power information
If the adversary announces the availability of high quality link to a neighbor, the 
receiving node will find out by comparing the table value with the received signal 
strength value. Note that each node keeps track of the RSSI value of all its neighbors. The 
RSSI value is expected to decrease with the decrease in remaining battery power. So any 
increase in the RSSI value from a node is not possible. By comparing the value of signal 
strength from a node and the value of RSSI exist in the table, a node can differentiate the 
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authentic and fake message. The node can then send the information to the base station 
for key revocation.
The remaining power of each node is indirectly proportional to the data rate. If the 
data rate requested by a neighbor is high, then the battery power of the node will reduce 
at a faster rate than the node which requested minimum data rate. Note that it is not true 
that if the data rate of one neighbor is low, then the battery power of the node will reduce 
slowly, because the neighbor node might be sending data at a higher to some other 
neighbor. Any announcement of having more power from the high data rate nodes can be 
compared by the received neighbor. For example if the data rate is 100 events / second, 
then the nodes on the data flow path should be receiving and sending 100 messages 
(except the source and base station where source only transmits and the base station only 
receives). This consumes more battery power. If the node on the data flow path calculates 
the remaining battery power of a neighbor based on the data rate, then the fake messages 
can be found out. Note that this calculation is necessary only when a neighbor sends an 
announcement regarding the battery power.
There is one problem with the above approach, knowing the battery power of the 
immediate neighbor alone is not enough. An adversary might try to send an 
announcement using other nodes id. For example, in the figure 9 let us consider that the 
adversary knows the pair-wise key used between E and B. The attacker might send a 
message about the power availability to node B faking its identity as E. In the message 
content, the adversary might announce that node E received the information from node D. 
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If such a message was sent, then the node B cannot find out whether the message 
received is a fake or authentic. Our above solution won’t work for this condition, so we 
are introducing a new technique to prevent this attack.
 If each node has the knowledge of the remaining battery power of all other nodes 
in the network, then the comparisons can be made for the farther nodes too. If nodes in 
the network share the information regarding the battery power and RSSI of their 
neighbors then this type of attack can be prevented. While forwarding the data message 
each node has to attach the remaining battery power value of all its neighbors in the 
packet. On receiving this message, each node stores the information. Note that no 
additional transmission and receiving is necessary in this case. The overhead of this 
approach is the need for extra memory space in each node to store the information about 
two hop neighbor nodes information.
5.5.2 Calculation of Remaining Energy
The ADC7 of the Mica mote gives the battery voltage [13].For our simulation we 
can use the two components provided by nesC language to calculate the remaining 
power, computeRates(..) and PowerMonQuery. Using the data sheets provided for the 
MICA mote, power required for all the operations can be calculated. 
5.6 Selective Forwarding
The selective forwarding is a type of attack in which the attacker, after receiving 
the data messages from the upstream neighbor does not forward all the messages. The 
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adversary can modify the data message or inject its own data message to the downstream 
nodes. In the figure below, let us consider that the data flows from A to B to C. If an 
attacker breaks the pair-wise key shared between B and A, then the adversary can modify 
the data message and then send to B. B further forwards the data message to the base 
station. 
Figure 11: Selective Forwarding
5.6.1 Proposed solution
In directed diffusion each node has a gradient towards each of its neighbor’s. 
Some nodes receive data messages at higher rate and others receive data message at the 
initial data rate. The important thing to remember here is the availability of alternate 
paths. The data messages received in the alternate paths can be used to find out whether 










In the figure 11 the dashed lines represent the low data rate paths. The data rate of 
path A->B->C is different from other paths (in our example it is 100 events /second); the 
low data rate paths receive data at 1 event/second. Let us assume that the adversary 
breaks the pair-wise shared key used between A and B. Now the adversary gets the 
access to the data messages from the source node. It can modify the data messages and 
send to B or selectively forward it to B. After receiving the modified packet the node B 
forwards the packet to the base station. Node B also sends the data messages to neighbors 
D, E, F, and G at initial data rate. The source node A also sends the data messages to its 
neighbors other than B (F and D). The data messages received from the source are stor d 
in the data cache of each node (a node drops a data message if that data message was 
already seen by the node). So node D will have data message from source A and node B 
in it data cache. By implementing a simple check mechanism to compare the two data 
messages, we can find out the selective forwarding attack. Note that the same comparison 
will be performed in all the neighbors of the node B. 
The data message comparison is application dependent. Let us take an example to 
explain this. Consider the chemical lab monitoring application. In this application the 
base station might spread interest information about the possible gas leak at specific 
location. In this application the base station expects either “YES” or “NO” as the 
message from the source node. Let us assume that maximum number of events from the 
source node contains “NO” and the rest of the events are “YES”. In this case the source 
node sends a “YES” to the nodes with the low data rate (Even if there is only one 
“YES”). The important thing to remember is the low data rate paths receive the 
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approximation of the 100 events, not the 100th event. If the adversary modifies the “YES” 
data message from the source to a “NO” and forwards it, then the nodes can find out the 
modification. Different techniques are used in other applications to find out whether the 
data is same or not. The confidence rate can be used for matching two events. The source 
node compares the stored wave form of an event with the sensed event and finds out the 
confidence value. 
In section 2.6.5, we discussed about the data cache. In the data cache each node 
maintains the last seen event (data message) from the neighbor. If a data comparison 
method is developed to check the data message received from a node and the data 
message present in the data cache, a node can also find out the fake data message. But 
each application needs a new data comparison technique. The basic idea is that there will 
be a relation between the two events of the same interest.
5.7 Data Fusion
Our above solution was based on the assumption that the data messages derived 
by the source node are authentic. If the source node was compromised (by breaking all 
the neighbor’s keys) then the adversary might derive its own data messages. The 
probability to break all the pair-wise keys of a node is very less, but if that ever happens 
then the whole purpose of setting up the sensor nodes will become useless. More over 
there is no way of finding whether the source node is compromised or not. To solve this 
problem Wenliang Du and Jing Deng proposed a Witness-based approach for data fusion 
assurance in wireless sensor networks [13]. In that paper, not only the source node 
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activates it’s sensors to collect data, even some of itsneighbors (chosen probabilistically) 
also collects the data. Note that not all the neighbors of a node can detect the event 
detected by the source node since some nodes may lie outside the radio range. The nodes 
which are collecting the events are called as witness nodes. These witness nodes does not 
forward the data like source node, it simply collects and stores the data. The base station 
will query these nodes for verifying the data send by the source node. I  [13], m out of n 
witness nodes is queried by the base station for verification. The witness nodes forward 
the encrypted message to the nodes and they further forward till the verification message 
reaches the base station. Using this technique the problem of compromised source node 
can be solved. By implementing this approach, the directed diffusion algorithm can be 
improved. The ideas proposed in [13] are based on the assumption that some of the 
neighbors of the source node can sense the same events with equal lesser confidence 
value.
5.7.1 Single Source Problem
Since the nodes are spread in the area of interest from a plane, there is a chance 
that some nodes do not have more than one neighbor. If that node becomes a source node 
and serves the data to the base station, the above said witness nodes method cannot be 
implemented. The adversary has a very good chance of breaking the key, and sending the 
false data to the base station. In order to prevent this type of attack we propose the 
implementation of concepts discussed in [19].
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5.7.2 Mobile Beacon
The paper [19] discusses how one mobile node can be used to localize the 
network. The mobile node which contains the GPS equipment traverses through the 
entire network to find and set the GPS location for each node. Th  mobile beacon can be 
a human operator, an unmannedv hicle deployed with the sensor network, or in the case 
of a deployment from a plane, the plane itself.The method presented in the paper [19] is 
radio-frequency (RF) based: the received signal strength indicator(RSSI) is used for 
ranging. The advantage of theRSSI ranging is its ubiquitous availability in practically all 
available receivers on the market. 
Figure 12: One mobile beacon assisting in the localization of a sensor field.
Figure 12 depicts a sensor network deployed over a geographical area. After 
deployment, a mobile beacontraverses the sensor network while broadcasting beacon 
packets. A beacon packet contains the coordinatesof the beacon. Any node receiving the 
beacon packet will be able to infer that it must be somewhere aroundthe mobile beacon 
with a certain probability. This information constrains the possible locations of a node.
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The RSSI is measured for each beacon that is received. Corresponding to the RSSI 
measurement and theposition of the beacon (xB; yB) (included in the beacon packet), 
each node receiving the beacon constructsa constraint on its position estimate:
Constraint(x; y) = PDFRSSI (d ((x, y), (xB, yB)) (x, y) [(xmin, xmax) * (ymin, ymax)] (1)
where PDFRSSI is the probability distribution function of the distance corresponding to 
the RSSI of thebeacon packet, d(A;B) is the Euclidean distance between points A and B, 
and xmin; xmax; ymin and ymaxare the bounding coordinates of the deployment area.
5.7.3 Proposed Solution
If there is only one node delivering the sensed values to the base station then, the 
base station can instruct the mobile node to reach the region where the single source is 
situated. Now the mobile node also can sense the events. The mobile node now acts as 
the witness node and collects the data and does not forward the data like the source node. 
The base station sends the query to the mobile node at random time interval to verify the 
source node’s data messages.
5.7.4 Implementation Issues
When the mobile node enters the network, it has to set up the pair-wise keys with 
the nodes which are currently its neighbors so that it can communicate with the nodes. 
This is similar to the node addition and leaving discussed in the LEAP algorithm. The 
mobile node has to carry all the m Master keys, where m is number of node addition 
events. With the addition of new nodes the security of the nodes increases.
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5.8 Effects of Node Inclusion and Exclusion
5.8.1 Node Addition
If a new node has to be added in the network then it should be loaded with the 
global key , the master key Ki and Kj(u) individual keys where j is 1< j <=m. The 
procedure for calculating the individual key of the node is same as discussed above. The 
base station can calculate the individual key of the newly added node (since it has the 
master key), using the individual key of the added node, the base station unicasts the 
“Hello” packet. The added node receives this message and calculates the signal strength 
value for the base station and stores it (so that it can authenticate any future message from 
base station).
The new node added in the network will broadcast the “Hello” packet with its id 
specified in the packet. The node which receives this packet replies by broadcasting 
“Hello” packets. Let us consider that the nodes u1 to uN are present in the network and 
node v is the new node. Now node v has to set up pair-wise key with all its neighbors’ u1
to uM where M <=n. Since the nodes u1 to uM already have the individual key of v, each 
can calculate the pair-wise shared key with node v. The procedure is same as the initial 
pair-wise key set-up of LEAP. The nodes u1 to uM add node v in their neighbor list.
In directed diffusion algorithm, the problem of adding a new node in the network 
is not addressed. This leads to path loss and excessive delay in the network once the 
nodes lose their power. LEAP provides a mechanism to add the nodes in the network and 
establish pair-wise shared keys with existing nodes (discussed above). But after addition, 
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the added node needs to know the interest information to build the gradients in the 
network. This problem can be solved if the added node’s neighbors pass the interest 
information to the new node. This will cause the added node v to receive the data 
messages from its neighbors. Note that the node v also builds the table for storing the 
RSSI and the battery power remaining of its neighbors from the message it received from 
them while setting up the pair-wise keys.
The addition of nodes in the network gives more security. Since the solutions 
proposed by us depend on the assumption that the sensor network is dense, addition of 
more nodes means the adversary has more nodes to compromise. 
5.8.2 Node Leaving
The directed diffusion addresses the problem of node failure in the network. It 
uses the negative reinforcement to truncate a path if a node does not respond with in a 
specified amount of time. Each node will maintain the remaining battery power 
information of all its neighbors. When the battery power of a node reaches a threshold 
level, then the neighbors of the node removes the id of the node from their list. This will 
cause the base station to select another path to get the data from the source node. The four 
type of attack discussed above depends on the assumption that there will be atleast two 
neighbors for each node (with enough power). The above discussed solution for node 
leaving will still work if the assumption is true. Let us take an example for each type of 
attack and prove that this is true. 
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5.8.2.1 Negative Reinforcement
Figure 13: Negative Reinforcement
Let us consider that the node C is the base station and node is the source. Let us 
also consider that the link AB is congested and B wants to send a negative reinforcement 
to A, to do this node B has to send a negative reinforcement to A and the negative 
reinforcement information to all its neighbors. Even if one or more nodes did not have 
enough power to forward the information to the source node, the availability of multiple 
paths ensures that atleast one other neighbor gives the information to the source. In the 
figure if both D and F fail at the same time then the negative reinforcement information 
does not reach the source node, but then our assumption that each node will have atleast 










The selective forwarding attack will be still found if our assumption that each 
node will have atleast two neighbors. The availability of multiple nodes to check the data 
from the source node ensures that the nodes in the data flow path sends the original data 
received from the source node to the base station. 
5.8.2.3 Path Influence and Cloning Attack
The solutions for these two attacks are not affected by the number of neighbor 
nodes. Since the solutions for these attacks is not dependent on other nodes. If a forged 
message is sent to a node then it will compare the value with the value present in the 




PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
6.1 Storage Requirement
In this section we will see the overheads involved if we implement the LEAP 
algorithm and our proposed methods in the existing directed diffusion algorithm. In our 
scheme, each node has to store an individual key, a group key and d pair-wise keys, 
where d is the number of one-hop neighbors. The number of bytes required depends on 
the density of the sensor networks. The total number of keys a node has to store is d+2 (d 
is the one hop neighbors). Each key is 8 bytes in length [1]. So the total bytes required for 
a node will be, (d+2)*8 bytes. Although memory is a very scarce resource for the current 
generation of sensor nodes (4 KBSRAM in a Berkeley Mica Mote) [2 leap], for a 
reasonable degree d, storage is not an issue in our scheme.
The nodes in the network need to store the RSSI value and the remaining battery 
value of all its one and two-hop neighbors. The RSSI and the remaining battery power 
take a byte each to store. So, the total bytes required for a node becomes, (d+2)*8 + (D + 
d)*2 bytes. Here D is the 2nd hop neighbor and d is the one-hop neighbor.
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Since there is no cluster key in our implementation, considerable amount of storage space 
in each node is saved when compared to LEAP (d per node). In LEAP each node has to 
have a cluster key. The cluster head of a cluster has to store the keys of all other cluster 
heads in the network. With the introduction of multiple Master keys the storage 
requirement increases. Depending upon the number of node additions, the memory 
required to store the keys increases.
6.2 Computational Cost
The pair-wise key and individual key set-up is done after the deployment. Each 
node has to calculate d pair-wise keys and one individual key. If there are N number of 
nodes in the sensor network then the number of key calculations will be,
∑ di + Nwhere i = 1 to N.
 The number of encryption and decryption is an important factor in determining 
the efficiency of our scheme. The base station encrypts the interest message using the 
global key and broadcast the message. The nodes after receiving the interest message, 
decrypts and stores the interest in the interest cache. This is followed by encrypting the 
message using the global key and broadcasting further. Each node will broadcast the 
interest message and neighbors decrypt the message. So if there are N numbers of nodes, 
then the number of encryption and decryption will be, 
∑di - Sj where S is the source node and j=1…M. M<=N and i=1 to N
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Besides the pair-wise key and individual key, each node also has to calculate the 
individual key of all its neighbors for verification. So the equation becomes,
∑2di - Sj where S is the source node and j=1…M. M<=N and i=1 to N
The computation cost to establish the keys in the network will be less for our 
proposed version when we compare with LEAP. Nodes don’t have to calculate the cluster 
keys in our case. Our case requires some additional c mparison for keeping the network 
secure. All the packets from the base station will be compared with the stored value of 
battery power remaining and RSSI value. This cost goes up when the number of interest 
message goes up. 
6.3 Communication Cost
Since the interests are broadcasted, each node has to transmit only once (15 mA 
[4]). But each node will receive the same interest from all of its neighbors (d*12 mA). 
The same applies for the data messages. So with the number of interests the 
communication cost increases. For I interest, the transmission and receiving cost for 
broadcasting will be,
I*summation of dj + I where j =1 to N.
For receiving and transmitting data messages, the communication cost will 
depend on the number of paths reinforced positively and the data rate requested by the 
downstream nodes. 
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Figure: 14: Communication Cost
In the above figure, let A be the source node and G be the base station. Let us also 
assume that the base station positively reinforces node D. Node D reinforces node A.
All the other nodes in the network receive the data at the initial data rate. If the data rate 
is 100 events per second in the data flow path (A->D->G) and 1 event per second in all 
other paths then the number of transmission and receiving will be,
              (2*100)*15 mA+(2*100)*12 mA+9*15 mA+9* 12 mA.
Using the above we can derive a generic equation for the power usage.
Let d number of neighbors of a node which is in the non data flow path and D be the 
number of nodes involved in the data flow path. The power required in the MAX data 
time will be,
((D-1)*MAX_DATA_RATE)*15 mA (for transmission) +











∑di  *15 mA (non data flow nodes transmission) +
∑di *12 mA (non data flow path receiving).
The communication cost for sending the queries and receiving the data message is 
same in our scheme and directed diffusion. Only when a node wants to send a negative 
reinforcement, it has to multicast the information about sending the negative 
reinforcement to all other neighbors. But a negative reinforcement message is not 
expected often in the network, so the overhead occurred by a few negative reinforcement 
can be compromised for increased security.
6.4 Packet Size
The following is the packet used by the TinySec, the keying mechanism recently 
proposed for the sensor networks. The packet format of TinyOS is also given for 
comparison purpose. For our purpose we will use the TinySec packet format with 



























Table 4: TinySec packet format
The nodes in our network have to include the remaining battery power. So the packet 















Table 5:Packet with power information.
The TinyOS packet format in the figure 1 does not have the source node 
information; this leaves the entire network vulnerable to the outsider attack. Any node 
can inject a packet with little effort. To detect transmission errors, TinyOS senders 
compute a16-bit cycle redundancy check (CRC) over the packet. Thereceiver 
recomputes the CRC during reception and verifies t with the received CRC field. If they 
are equal, the receiveraccepts the packet and rejects it otherwise [1- TinySec]. But this 
CRC does not provide any security from attacks. Since we have included the MAC field, 
CRC is not needed. Active message types are similar to port numbers in TCP/IP. The AM 
type specifies the appropriate handler function, to extract and interpret the message on the
receiver.The TinyOS packet format contains a group field to prevent different sensor 
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networks from interfering with eachother. It can be thought of as a kind of weak access 
controlmechanism for non-malicious environments [1- TinySec]. The Ctr field is used 
for specifying the packet numbers. Our implementation needs one extra byte from the 
TinySec packet format (not from the directed diffusion). 
6.5 Security Analysis
Though our algorithm requires more memory space and more energy for 
computation, it def nds the sensor nodes against the possible attacks. With the 
introduction of LEAP algorithm, the outsider attack has been completely eliminated. The 
LEAP algorithm prevents the sinkhole and wormhole attacks. The solution presented by 
us will provide more security to the network even if some of the nodes in the network are 
compromised. We have introduced the use of mobile nodes so that there is always more 





C++ code was written to simulate the sensor networks of sizes 10, 30 and 50. The 
performance of our proposed algorithm relies on the density of the network. The x and y 
coordinate for each node was generated randomly and stored in a C++ structure variable.
The node with id 1 is assumed as the base station and the last node is set as the source 
node. The distance between every pair of nodes in the network was found in order to 
establish multiple paths between the base station and the source nodes.The random 
placement of the nodes in the constant area is necessary since our proposed algorithm’s 
performance depends on the density of the nodes.
7.2 Storage Requirement
The original directed diffusion algorithm does not use any keying mechanism 
therefore the memory required in each node is very minimal. In our algorithm each node 
has to store one individual key, one group key and d number of pair-wise keys, where d is 
the is the number of neighbors of a node. The following graph was plotted for the storage 
requirement for the sensor network of size 10, 30 and 50. The nodes were placed at 
random location and the simulation was run for 30 times each for 10, 30 and 50 nodes. 
From the figure 15, we can infer that the memory require to store the keys increases with 
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the increase in the number of nodes. The table 6 shows the result of 30 simulations.The 
result for 30 nodes varies from 6594 to 4650; the reason for this variation is because of 
the varying number of neighbors for the nodes. Each node has to store an individual key, 
a group key, d pair-wise keys, where d is the number of one-hop neighbors and the RSSI 




























































Table 6: Simulation Result for 10, 30 and 50 nodes
7.3 Communication Cost
In our proposed algorithm each node has to find and store the id’s of all the
neighbor nodes before communicating with them. The initial set-up of sensor network is 
different in our algorithm then the original directed diffusion. In order to establish the 
pair-wise key with all its neighbors, each node has to send a “hello” packet. The other 
communication overhead introduced in our algorithm is the “hello” packet sent by the 
base station to all the nodes in the network so that the nodes in the network calculate and 
store the base station’s RSSI value. The following graph shows the communication 
overhead caused by our algorithm and the original communication cost of the directed 
diffusion algorithm.
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Figure 16: Power Consumption
Form the figure 16 we can see that the difference between the directed diffusion 
and our proposed algorithm increases with the increase in the network size.Th  above 
graph also shows the overhead caused by our proposed solution for the negative 
reinforcement. Even if there is an authentic negative reinforcement, there will be 
communication and computation overhads in our proposed algorithm. If a node sends a 
negative reinforcement to an upstream neighbor, then it has to send the negative 
reinforcement information to all its neighbors, which is not done in the directed diffusion 
algorithm. As we can see from the above graph, the increase in the network size and the 
density causes more transmission and reception in the network. Thus the overhead 







































10 6033 6422 24163 24257
30 21339 23056 40528 40620
50 41360 44730 62112 62204
Table 7: Simulation result for Communication Cost
7.4 Computational Cost
Our solutions to all the four type of attacks require somecomputational power. 
Our proposed solution to the selective forwarding algorithm causes more overhead, since 
all the packets forwarded in the high data flow path has to be compared by all other 
nodes. The solutions to other three types of attacks require the nodes to compare nly 
when the need arises whereas in case of selective forwarding, the nodes have to compare 
all the time the interest is active. Besides the comparison overheads, the other 
computational energy required is for the encryption and decryption of the messages 
transmitted in the network. 
7.4.1 Selective Forwarding
When the nodes in the high data flow path sends the data to the base station, the 
low data flow path nodes have to compare the data forwarded by the nodes in the high 
data flow nodes. The computation overhead for implementing selective forwarding 
depends upon the number of nodes in the low data flow path. The following graph shows 
that the power consumption increases with the number of nods.  
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Table 8: Simulation result for Selective Forwarding
7.4.2 Negative Reinforcement
When the base station or any node in the network send a negative reinforcement, 
the upstream node which receives this negative reinforcement, process only after 
comparing the same information from all its neighbors. The node which received the 
negative reinforcement information will forward the negative reinforcement to the 
upstream node only after receiving the negative reinforcement information atleast from 
two neighbors. The computation overhead caused by this type of attack is minimal and 
also this overhead occurs only when there is a negativ  reinforcement passed by some 
nodes in the network. The negative reinforcement is not expectedfrequently in a sensor 
network. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our simulation results show that the storage space required increases with the 
increase in the number of nodes in the network. But when compared to the LEAP 
algorithm, our algorithm requires less memory space since our algorithm uses only three 
types of keys. In the case of negative reinforcement, our proposed algorithm differs from 
directed diffusion only by few transmissions. The density of the network determines the 
storage space required for each node: if there are more neighbors for a node then the node 
has to store more keys, thus increasing the memory requirement. Our proposed algorithm 
can be used for applications which require mssage authentication and message 
confidentiality. We have assumed that the network is static; our proposed algorithm can 
be improved so that it handles the mobile nodes too. Each packet contains the 
information about remaining battery power information and RSSI value of a node. This 
approach can be modified so that the packet size is reduced. In directed diffusion a node 
transmits the interest information even to the node which originally sent it. This work can 
be extended by analyzing the duplicate interest problem and providing a solution. The 
packet size is also an important factor in determining the efficiency of our algorithm. 
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